We consider the complexity of stochastic games { simple games of chance played by two players. We show that the problem of deciding which player has the greatest chance of winning the game is in the class NP \ co-NP.
that lie between P and NP \ co-NP are rare. The stochastic game problem de ned in this paper is an interesting example of a simple combinatorial problem with this property.
The study of stochastic games was initiated by Shapley 10] in 1953 and many variations of the model have been investigated since then (see Peters and Vrieze 9] for a survey). The class of stochastic games studied in this paper is somewhat similar to the stochastic games with switching transitions, studied by Filar 4] . We were motivated to study these simple stochastic games while considering the power of the following complexity model: space bounded alternating Turing machines, generalized to allow random as well as universal and existential moves. (Alternating Turing machines are described in 1]). A polynomial time algorithm for the simple stochastic game problem would imply that adding randomness to space bounded alternating Turing machines does not increase the class of languages they accept.
In Section 2, we give a more precise de nition of the stochastic game problem considered in the paper and describe properties of stochastic games. In Section 3, we show that the decision problem associated with these questions lies in the class NP \ co-NP. We also describe some special cases where the problem can be solved in polynomial time, namely when the graph is restricted to have just two of the three types of vertices max, min and average. In Section 4, we brie y describe variations of the SSG model and examine their complexity, and list some open problems.
De nitions and Properties of Simple Stochastic Games
In this section, we de ne precisely the model of stochastic games considered in this paper. We describe some basic properties of strategies of the players of such games. Many of the results presented here have previously appeared in the literature of stochastic games; we include them for completeness and because in some cases they can be simpli ed or strengthened for the special class of games studied in this paper.
De nitions
A simple stochastic game (SSG) is a directed graph G = (V; E) with the following properties. The vertex set V is the union of disjoint sets V max ; V min ; V average , called max, min and average vertices, together with two special vertices, called the 0-sink and the 1-sink. One vertex of V is called the start vertex. Each vertex of V has two outgoing edges, except the sink vertices, which have no outgoing edges. Without loss of generality, assume that the vertices of G are numbered 1; 2; . . .n, with n?1 and n being the 0-and 1-sink vertices, respectively. An example of a SSG is given in Figure 1 .
Associated with the game are two players, 0 and 1. A strategy of player 0 is a set of edges of E, each with its left end at a min vertex such that for each min vertex i there is exactly one edge (i; j) in . Informally, if (i; j) 2 then in a game where player 0 uses strategy , the token is always moved from vertex i to vertex j. Similarly, a strategy of player 1 is a set of edges of E, each with its left end at a max vertex such that for each max vertex i there is exactly one edge (i; j) in . In the game theory literature, strategies satisfying this de nition are called pure stationary strategies because (i) the players do not use probabilistic choice in choosing a move, and (ii) each player chooses the same move from a vertex every time that vertex is reached. We only consider pure stationary strategies in this paper because, as we will see later, both players of a SSG have optimal strategies of this type. (For a discussion of other types of strategies, see Peters and Vrieze 9] ). Corresponding to strategy is a graph G , which is the subgraph of G obtained by removing from each max vertex the outgoing edge that is not in the strategy . Similarly, corresponding to a pair of strategies and , is a graph G ; obtained from G by removing from each min vertex the outgoing edge that is not in . In G ; , every max and min vertex has one outgoing edge. Thus G ; can be considered as a Markov process where the states of the process are the vertices of G and the transition probabilities p ij ; 1 i; j n are de ned as follows. If i n ? 1 then p ij = 1 2 if i is an average vertex with outgoing edge (i; j); p ij = 1 if i is a max or min vertex with outgoing edge (i; j) and p ij = 0 otherwise. Since n ? 1 and n are sink states, we de ne p nn = p n?1n?1 = 1, p nj = 0 if j 6 = n and p n?1j = 0 if j 6 = n ? 1. We say a SSG halts with probability 1 if for all pairs of strategies ; , every vertex in G ; has a path to a sink vertex.
We de ne the value v ; (i) of each vertex i of G with respect to strategies and to be the probability that player 1 wins the game if the start vertex is i and the players use strategies and . That is, the value v ; (i) is the probability of reaching the 1-sink vertex from the start vertex on a random walk of the Markov process G ; , starting from vertex i. In Figure 2 , the subgraph of the SSG of Figure 1 is given, for strategies = f(1; 5); (3; 4); (6;7)g and = f(4; 3)g of player 1 and 0, respectively. 
We next show that the equations (1) Q l = 0. We show that for any m 1, the sum of the terms in any row of Q mn is at most (1 ? 1=2 n ) m . Since all terms of Q l are non-negative for any l, it follows from this that as l ! 1, Q l ! 0. Note that the ijth entry of Q mn is the probability of reaching vertex j from vertex i in exactly mn steps. When m is 1, the sum of the terms of the ith row of Q mn is at most 1 minus the probability of reaching a sink vertex of G ; from i in n steps. Since a sink vertex is reachable from i, there must be a path of length n in G ; from i to a sink. Hence the probability of reaching a sink from i in n steps is at least 1=2 n . Therefore, the sum of the terms in any row of Q n is at most 1 ? 1=2 n . The proof for m > 1 is an easy induction argument. ? 1 is non-negative and the entries along the diagonal are strictly positive. 2 We de ne the value of the game G to be max min v ; (start):
Informally, the value of the game is the maximum probability that player 1 wins if it reveals its best strategy to player 0 at the start of the game; and player 0 plays its best strategy against the strategy chosen by player 1.
Given a SSG, a natural question is: what is its value? A related problem is to nd the best strategies of the players, that is, the strategies and such that the value of the game equals v ; (start). To investigate the complexity of these problems, we consider the following decision problem for SSG's.
The SSG value problem is: Given a SSG, is its value > 1=2? In Section 3, we show that this decision problem is in the class NP \ co-NP. To build up to the proof, we describe many interesting properties of simple stochastic games in Section 2.2.
Properties of Simple Stochastic Games
We next describe some properties of the value and of the strategies of simple stochastic games. We rst show that the value of a SSG is a rational number of the form p=q where 0 p; q 4 n . From this, it is possible to bound the value of a SSG away from 1=2, if it is not equal to 1=2. In the succeeding lemmas, we build up to the proof that both players possess \optimal" strategies { strategies that are guaranteed to ensure that the outcome of the game is the best possible for that player, regardless of what the other player does or what the start vertex is. Finally in Lemma 6 we describe a strong form of the minimax theorem for simple stochastic games. We show by induction on t that any t t matrix A with property (*) has determinant at most 2 t . If t = 1, the determinant is at most 2. If t > 1, then by the induction hypothesis, the absolute value of the determinant of any minor of A is at most 4 t?1 . This is because the minors of A also have property (*). Hence the determinant of A is at most 4 t?1 times the sum of the absolute values of the entries in the rst row of A. This product is at most 4 t , again applying property (*).
Thus D is at most 4 t 4 n?1 , since t < n. Also, since the value of each vertex is at most 1, the value of each N i is an integer D. Thus the value of each vertex of G ; is the quotient of two numbers, each of value at most 4 n?1 . In particular this is true for the start vertex of G ; .
Since the strategies and were chosen arbitrarily, max min v ; (start) must be the quotient of two numbers, each of value at most 4 n?1 . 2 Lemma 3 If the value of a simple stochastic game with n vertices is > 1=2, then it is 1=2 + 1=4 n .
Proof: From Lemma 2, the value of a simple stochastic game with n vertices is of the form p=q where p and q are integers, 0 p; q 4 n?1 . If p=q > 1=2, then 2p q + 1. Hence, p=q = 2p=2q (q + 1)=2q = 1=2 + 1=2q 1=2 + (1=2)4 n?1 > 1=2 + 1=4 n : 2
In the following lemmas, we describe properties of optimal strategies of the players of a SSG. For simplicity, we only consider SSG's that halt with probability 1 in the rest of this section. (Recall that a SSG halts with probability 1 if on all pairs of strategies ; , a sink vertex is reachable from every vertex of G ; ). We rst show that for each strategy of player 1, there is a strategy ( ) of player 0 that is \optimal" with respect to in that for every min vertex i of G, the value of i with respect to strategies ; ( ) equals the minimum of the values of its children. We call ( ) an optimal strategy of player 0 with respect to strategy .
Lemma 4 (Howard 6] ) Let G be a simple stochastic game with n vertices that halts with probability 1 and let be any strategy of player 1. Then there is some strategy ( ) such that for each vertex i 2 V min with neighbors j and k,
Proof: Howard 6] described an algorithm to construct ( ) satisfying the lemma. The algorithm proceeds in iterations. There is a current strategy (q) for each iteration q; the current strategy of the initial iteration is chosen arbitrarily and is denoted by (0). Strategy (q + 1) is constructed from strategy (q) by nding any one vertex i 2 V min with neighbors j; k such that (i; j) 2 (q) but v ; (q) (k) < v ; (q) (j) and replacing (i; j) by (i; k). If no such vertex exists, the algorithm halts. The current strategy of the nal iteration is ( ). From the construction of ( ), it must be the case that for each vertex i 2 V min with neighbors j and k, v ; ( ) (i) = min v ; ( ) (j); v ; ( ) (k)].
To prove that Howard's algorithm is correct, it remains to show that it always halts. To simplify the notation in the proof, let v q (i) = v ; (q) (i). The fact that Howard's algorithm halts follows from the following property, which we will prove: if the algorithm does not halt at round q then strategy (q + 1) improves strategy (q) in that for each vertex l of G, v q+1 (l) v q (l) and for at least one vertex the inequality is strict. This ensures that no strategy can be repeated in the sequence (0); (1); . . .; ( ). Since there are only a nite number of strategies (at most 2 n ) for player 1, the sequence is nite.
Clearly, for the 0-and 1-sink vertices, which are numbered n ? 1 and n, 0 = v q+1 (n ? 1) = v q (n ? 1) and 1 = v q+1 (n) = v q (n). Therefore we restrict our attention to the vertices numbered 1 . . .n ? 2. Let t = n ? 2. Let v q = (v q (1); . . .; v q (t)) T remains to show that 0 and that one entry is actually > 0. Suppose edge (i; k) replaces (i; j) in constructing (q + 1) from (q). Hence Q q and Q q+1 di er in at most the ith row and similarly b q and b q+1 di er in at most the ith row. Thus every entry of must be 0, except possibly the ith entry.
Moreover, the ith entries of Q q v q + b q and Q q+1 v q + b q+1 are v q (j) and v q (k) respectively; hence the ith entry of is v q (j) ? v q (k). Since edge (i; k) replaces (i; j) in constructing (q + 1) from (q), it must be the case that v q (j) > v q (k) and hence the ith entry of must be > 0. This completes the proof that Howard's algorithm halts. 2 The next lemma shows that in any SSG G that halts with probability 1, player 1 has a strategy 0 which is optimal in the following sense. Suppose player 0 uses some optimal strategy ( 0 ) with respect to strategy 0 . Then for each vertex i 2 V max , the value of i with respect to strategies 0 and ( 0 ) is the maximum of the values of its children. We call any such pair of strategies 0 ; 0 = ( 0 ) an optimal pair of strategies. The proof of this lemma is a straightforward extension of Lemma 4; similar proofs for other classes of stochastic games are surveyed in 9].
Lemma 5 Let G be a simple stochastic game with n vertices that halts with probability 1. Then there is a strategy 0 of player 1 such that, for some optimal strategy 0 = ( 0 ) of player 0 with respect to strategy 0 , for all vertices i 2 V max with neighbors j and k, Proof: Again the strategy 0 can be found by an iterative method similar to Lemma 4. In the iterative algorithm to construct 0 , there is a current strategy (q) for each iteration q; the current strategy for the initial iteration is chosen arbitrarily. Let (q) be an optimal strategy of player 0 with respect to strategy (q). Such a strategy can be found using the algorithm of Lemma 4. Let v q (l) denote v (q); (q) (l). Strategy (q + 1) is constructed from strategy (q) by nding any one vertex i 2 V max such that (i; j) 2 (q) but v q (k) > v q (j) and replacing (i; j) by (i; k). If no such vertex exists the algorithm halts; the current strategy of the nal iteration is 0 . Let 0 be an optimal strategy of player 0 with respect to 0 . From this construction, it must be the case that for each vertex i 2 V max with neighbors j and k, v 0 ; 0 (i) = max v 0 ; 0 (j); v 0 ; 0 (k)].
As in Lemma 4, to show that the iterative algorithm halts, it is su cient to show that v q+1 (l) v q (l) and that the inequality is strict for some l. The proof of this is complicated by the fact that at each iteration, both (q) and (q) are being changed, whereas in the construction of Lemma 4 only one strategy is changed. However, the key elements in the proof are similar.
Suppose that (i; k) replaces (i; j) in the construction of (q + 1) from (q) and that (i 0 ; k 0 ) replaces (i 0 ; j 0 ) in the construction of (q + 1) from (q). We restrict the proof to the case where (q + 1) and (q) di er in only 1 edge; the proof can easily be generalized to the case when they di er in more than one edge.
Again, it is immediate that v q+1 (l) v q (l) for l = n ? 1 or n. Therefore we consider the vertices 1; . . .; t, where t = n ? 2. Recall that we de ned the value of a SSG G to be the max min v ; (start). In fact, it is equivalent to switch the order of max and min quanti ers in this de nition. In the next lemma, we show that both the max-min and the min-max de nitions are equivalent, for SSG's that halt with probability 1. The proof is a straightforward application of the techniques of the preceding lemmas. Similar results have been proved for many types of stochastic games (see Peters and Vrieze 9] ), but this result is stronger than others because of our restriction to pure strategies of the players.
Lemma 6 Let G be any simple stochastic game that halts with probability 1. if i = n:
We call the set of vectors z for which z = I( z) the solutions of G. Then from Lemma 5, it is straightforward to show that if G is a SSG that halts with probability 1, then for any pair of optimal strategies 0 ; 0 , the vector v 0 ; 0 = (v 0 ; 0 (1); . . .; v 0 ; 0 (n)) is a solution of G. From this it follows that if G has a unique solution, then v opt = v 0 ; 0 , for any pair of optimal strategies 0 ; 0 .
Complexity Results
In this section we show that the SSG value problem is in NP \ co-NP. We will use the fact that if G has a unique solution, the value vector v opt of G equals this solution. Moreover, given a vector z is is easy to check that it is a solution of G. These facts form the basis of the proof that the SSG problem is in NP \ co-NP. Roughly, if a game G has a unique solution, then a nondeterministic algorithm can guess the solution and it can be deterministically checked if the value of the start vertex in that solution is greater than 1=2. In general however, the solution of a simple stochastic game may not be unique.
Therefore, we show that in time polynomial in the size of an SSG G, we can construct from G a new game G 0 such that G 0 has a unique solution and the value of G 0 > 1=2 if and only if the value of G > 1=2. The new game G 0 is called a stopping SSG because it halts with probability 1; this fact will be used to prove that G 0 has a unique solution. (The term \stopping stochastic game" was introduced by Shapley 10] . Stopping games are also known as discounted stochastic games). From this construction, note that if a path is followed from vertex i, the rst vertex from the set f1; . . .; ng that is reached is either vertex j or vertex n ? 1 (the 0-sink); and this vertex is reached in at most m + 1 steps. Therefore, with probability 1=2 m the 0-sink is the rst vertex from the set f1; . . .; ng that is reached on a random walk from i. If the 0-sink vertex is reached, the game ends. The resulting stopping game is called a 1=2 m -stopping game because at any step of the game, from any vertex in the set f1; . . .; ng, the probability of ending the game before reaching another vertex in the set f1; . . .; n?2g is at least 1=2 m . Shapley 10] showed that any stopping game constructed in this manner has a unique solution; we include the proof here for completeness.
Lemma 7 (Shapley, 10] The last step to proving the main theorem is completed in the next lemma, where it is shown that the value of a SSG is > 1=2 if and only if the value of the corresponding (1=2 cn )-stopping game is > 1=2, for some constant c > 0. This lemma is a discrete version of a result of Filar 4] who proved that the value of G is the limit, as ! 0, of the value of the -stopping game corresponding to G. Lemma 8 There is a constant c > 0, such that if G is a SSG with n vertices, the value of G is > 1=2 if and only if the value of the corresponding (1=2 cn )-stopping game is > 1=2.
Proof: One direction of this proof is straightforward; it is not hard to see that the stopping SSG corresponding to any SSG must have lower value. Hence if the value of G 1=2 it must be the case that the value of any -stopping game is 1=2. Let G 0 be the -stopping SSG corresponding to G for some = 1=2 cn and let v 0 be the value vector of G 0 . Since G and G 0 have the same number of max and min vertices, there is a 1-1 correspondence between the strategies of both games. We show that for any pair of strategies and of the players, To complete this section, we prove that special cases of the SSG value problem are actually in P.
Theorem 2 The SSG value problem restricted to SSG's with just (1) average and max vertices, or (2) average and min vertices, or (3) max and min vertices can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof: The proof for case (1) is due to Derman 3] . Let G = (V; E) be an SSG with n vertices.
From Lemma 8 we assume that G is a stopping game, so that G has a unique solution. We claim that the solution of G is the optimal solution to the following linear programming problem: minimize P n l=1 v 0 (l) < P n l=1 v(l), which proves the contradiction. The other case is that for some average vertex i, (i; j) and (i; k) are edges of G but v(i) > 1=2(v(j) + v(k)). A similar argument to the rst case shows that this leads to a contradiction. Hence the optimal solution to the linear programming problem must be the unique solution of the SSG G.
Khachian 7] has shown that the linear programming problem is computable in time polynomial in the length of the input, which is polynomial in n in this case, completing the proof for the max and average case.
The proof for case (2) , where G has just min and average vertices, is very similar to the proof of (1). In this case, the linear programming problem is to maximize The number of executions of the repeat loop is bounded by jV j since on every iteration of the repeat loop except the last, at least one vertex is moved from U to D. From this it is clear that the algorithm runs in polynomial time.
We next explain why the algorithm correctly computes the values of the vertices. Given a SSG G as input, let D final and U final be the sets U and D when the repeat loop of the algorithm is exited. It is straightforward to show that any vertex i in D final has the correct value, by induction on the number of times the repeat loop is executed before i is moved to D.
Suppose vertex i is in U final . To show that the algorithm is correct, we need to show that max min v ; (i) = 0:
Let be following strategy. If i is a min vertex in D final and both of its children have value 1, choose one child j arbitrarily and let contain the edge (i; j). Otherwise one of its children has value 0; choose a child j of i with value 0 and let contain the edge (i; j). If i is a min vertex in U final , then one of its children, say j, is also in U final . Otherwise i would have been moved from U to D at some iteration of the repeat loop. Again, let contain the edge (i; j). Now, let be any strategy of player 1. We show that v ; (i) = 0. To do this, it is su cient to show that there is no path from i to the 1-sink in G ; . Since there are no average vertices in G, the edges of G ; are exactly the edges in . Suppose there is a path from i to the 1-sink. Then there must be a path from i to a vertex in D final with value 1. This implies that there must be an edge of from some vertex in U final to a vertex in D final with value 1. But there is no edge from a max vertex of U final to a vertex in D final with value 1; otherwise i would have been moved from U to D on some iteration of the repeat loop. Also, there are no edges in from a min vertex of U final to a vertex of D final with value 1, by de nition of . This contradicts the assumption that there is a path from i to the 1-sink in G ; ; hence v(i) = 0. 2
Relationship between Stochastic Games and Complexity Classes
Our motivation for studying the SSG problem stems from a study of probabilistic complexity classes. The realization that a source of random bits can be useful in nding solutions to problems has motivated the study of probabilistic algorithms and models of computation. Recently, randomness has been added to nondeterministic and alternating machines in novel ways, giving rise to various \game-like" complexity classes. One example is the games against nature of Papadimitriou 8] , a model that combines the features of nondeterministic and probabilistic Turing machines (Gill 5] ). We brie y describe games against nature and some problems that they naturally model, and then show that the SSG problem with just max and average vertices is complete for the class of languages accepted by log space bounded games against nature. Finally, we show that the more general SSG value problem, with max, min and average vertices is complete for the class of languages accepted by log space bounded randomized alternating Turing machines.
Roughly, a game against nature is a special kind of nondeterministic Turing machine, whose states are partitioned into existential (9) and random states. Without loss of generality, we assume that the Turing machine has exactly two choices at every step, except when a nal state (accepting or rejecting) is reached, in which case the Turing machine halts. The nodes of a computation tree of such a machine on a xed input are naturally partitioned into existential and random nodes, depending on whether the state of the con guration labeling the node is existential or random, respectively. Let M be a game against nature and let T be the computation tree of M on input x. De ne an 9-subtree T 0 to be any subtree of T, with the same root as T, where every internal existential node has exactly one child. The input x is accepted by M if and only if there is some 9-subtree T 0 such that the probability of reaching an accepting leaf is > 1=2, when a path is followed randomly from the root of T 0 by choosing each child of a random node with probability 1=2. Time and space bounded games against nature can be de ned just as are time and space bounded nondeterministic or probabilistic Turing machines.
Polynomial time bounded games against nature model a certain class of problems in optimization, called decision problems under uncertainty. An example of such a problem is the stochastic scheduling problem, described by Papadimitriou 8] . Suppose t tasks are to be scheduled on m processors so as to minimize the total time to execute all the tasks. There are precedence constraints among the tasks and the execution times of the tasks are random variables. The scheduling process can be thought of as a game against nature where player 1, modeling the scheduler, chooses the best set of tasks to schedule and player 0, modeling nature, randomly chooses which job will halt rst. This problem is naturally modeled by a time bounded game against nature because the game between the scheduler and nature ends as soon as all jobs are completed. Papadimitriou used the model of a polynomial time bounded game against nature to show that the stochastic scheduling problem and similar decision problems under uncertainty are complete for PSPACE.
Other optimization problems, where long-term costs are to be optimized, can be modeled by space bounded games against nature. Derman 3] describes an example of an inventory system for a given product where the inventory is under periodic review. After each review, a decision is made to add a certain amount of the product to the inventory level. The goal is to optimize a cost function that depends on factors such as the cost of holding the inventory in storage or the cost of shortages caused by random uctuations in demand. A criterion for optimality would normally be a function of long-term costs.
Denote the class of log space bounded games against nature by GAN-SPACE(log(n)). Condon 2] showed that the SSG value problem, with just max and average vertices, is complete for the class GAN-SPACE(log(n)). To see this, note that a game against nature can simulate a play of a SSG G using only log space, by following the edges of G, choosing an edge existentially from max vertices and randomly from average vertices. From this it follows that the SSG value problem with max and average vertices is in GAN-SPACE(log(n)). The problem is complete for GAN-SPACE(log(n)), with respect to deterministic log space reductions, because a space bounded game against nature M on a xed input x can be represented by a SSG in the following way. The vertices of the SSG are labeled by con gurations of M on x and the edges represent one-step transitions between con gurations. If a vertex is labeled by a con guration with a random state, it is an average vertex, otherwise it is a max vertex. The vertices labeled by the initial, accept and rejecting con gurations are the start, the 1-sink and the 0-sink vertices, respectively. The SSG constructed in this way has value > 1=2 if and only if the game against nature M accepts the xed input x. Moreover, given a description of M, it is straightforward to construct the SSG for an input x in space O(logjxj).
Just as randomness can be added to nondeterministic machines to obtain games against nature, randomness can also be added to the alternating Turing machines of Chandra, Kozen and Stockmeyer 1] to obtain randomized alternating Turing machines. Randomized alternating Turing machines generalize games against nature in the following way: the states are partitioned into three types: existential (9), universal (8) and random. Let T be the computation tree of a randomized alternating Turing machine on input x. An 9-subtree T 0 of T is de ned just as before. We further de ne a 8-subtree T 00 to be a subtree of T 0 with the same root as T 0 , where every internal universal node has exactly one child.
The input x is accepted by M if there is some 9-subtree T 0 such that for all 8-subtrees T 00 of T 0 , the probability of reaching an accepting leaf of T 00 is > 1=2, when a path is followed randomly from the root of T 00 . In 2], we denote the class of languages accepted by log space bounded randomized alternating Turing machines by AUC-SPACE(log(n)). The SSG value problem is log space complete for the class AUC-SPACE(log(n)). The proof of this is a straightforward generalization of the proof that the SSG problem with just max and average vertices is complete for GAN-SPACE(log(n)).
Extensions and Open Problems
There are many ways to generalize simple stochastic games. We describe some of these generalizations in this section and consider whether the results of the previous sections extend to these generalized classes of stochastic games.
A natural generalization is to allow more than two edges from a vertex and to allow edges from average vertices to be labeled with arbitrary rational probabilities, such that the probabilities from each average vertex sum to 1. Suppose G is a stochastic game with n vertices generalized in this way such that all edges from average vertices of G are labeled with probabilities of the form p=q where 0 p q 2 m . Then, as we outline next, in time polynomial in maxfm; ng, G can be transformed to a SSG G 0 such that the value of G equals the value of G 0 . Hence the value problem for these stochastic games is also in NP \ co-NP.
Brie y, G 0 can be constructed from G in two stages. In the rst stage, the out degree of every vertex is reduced to two by replacing each vertex with fanout l where l > 2 by a binary tree with l leaves, and relabeling the edges with the appropriate probabilities. In the second stage, if i is a vertex with two children j and k and edges labeled with probabilities p 1 =q, p 2 =q, where 2 t < q 2 t+1 , then i is replaced by a complete binary tree of average vertices of depth t + 1, rooted at i. All outgoing edges of p 1 of the leaves of this tree point to j; all outgoing edges of p 2 of the leaves of this tree point to t; and the remaining leaves point to i, the root of the tree. This construction guarantees that the probability of reaching j and k from i is exactly p 1 =q and p 2 =q, respectively.
Another generalization, standard in the literature on stochastic games is to allow payo s at the vertices. Simple stochastic games with payo s were studied by Filar 4] . Suppose that each vertex of a stochastic game is labeled with a rational number, called its payo . Let the payo associated with vertex i be denoted by a i (the payo s can be negative). Assume that the payo s are of the form p=q where 1 p; q 2 n . The interpretation of the payo in the game is that whenever the token is placed on vertex i, player 0 must pay amount a i to player 1. In such games, the value of a game may not be well-de ned in general. Hence we only consider stopping games, where the expected total winnings of either player on any play of the game is nite. That is, we assume that there is one special sink vertex with payo 0 and that for all pairs of strategies of the players, this vertex is eventually reached with probability 1 on any play of the game.
Let G be a simple stochastic game with payo s, such that G is a stopping game. For a xed pair of strategies and of the players, the value of the vertices of G with respect to and is the unique solution to the equation v ; = Q v ; + a, where a is the vector of payo s of the vertices and Q is the 1-step transition matrix of the graph G ; , excluding the special sink vertex. Lemmas 4 { 6 of Section 2.1 generalize to show that there is a pair of optimal pure strategies 0 , 0 of players 1 and 0 respectively such that for all vertices l, min max v ; (l) = v 0 ; 0 (l) = max min v ; (l):
Also the de nitions of an iteration function and a solution, given in Section 3, generalize to SSG's with payo s. Thus the results of Section 3 can be extended to show that the value problem for stopping SSG's with payo s is in NP \ co-NP.
The last generalization we consider was introduced by Shapley 10] in his original paper on stochastic games. In this model, the players move simultaneously at each step of the game. The vertices of the graph are partitioned into two groups, which we call the average and the strategic vertices. We assume that there are four edges from each strategic vertex, each labeled by a tuple (b 0 ; b 1 ), where b 0 ; b 1 2 f0; 1g. In playing the game, when the token is placed on a strategic vertex, players 0 and 1 simultaneously choose a binary value for bits b 0 and b 1 , respectively. The pair of bits chosen determines to which neighbor the token is moved.
Because of the simultaneity in this model, in order for the minimax result (Lemma 6) to hold, it is necessary to generalize the de nition of a strategy of a player. A mixed (or probabilistic) strategy of player 0 is a set of pairs (p 0i ; p 1i ), one per strategic vertex i, such that p 0i + p 1i = 1. The interpretation of this strategy is that when the token is on vertex i, player 0 chooses value 0 for b 0 with probability p 0i and value 1 for b 0 with probability p 1i . A mixed strategy of player 1 is de ned similarly. With this de nition of strategy, the results of Section 2 extend to simultaneous stochastic games (see Shapley 10] ). However, it is an open problem whether the value problem for simultaneous stochastic games is in NP \ co-NP. One obstacle to solving this is that the value of a simultaneous stochastic game need not be rational -see 9] for an example of this.
Finally, a challenging open problem is whether the SSG value is in P. A related problem which might be of signi cance in solving this is the following. Is there a polynomial time algorithm that separates graphs with high value from those with low value? More precisely, let A be the set of SSG's that have value > 3=4 and let B be the set of SSG's that have value < 1=4. Then it would be of interest to nd a polynomial time decision algorithm M that, on input G 2 A B, accepts if and only if G 2 A.
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